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Abstract
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domains. In TraumAID 2.0, a consultation system for multiple trauma management, we have developed
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planning and action. In this paper, we present Goal-Directed Diagnosis (GDD), the diagnostic reasoning
component of this framework. Taking the view that a diagnosis is only worthwhile to the extent that it can
affect subsequent decisions, GDD focuses on the formation of appropriate goals for its complementary
planner.
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decisions for which it was carried out in the fust place. We
called that the Goal-Directed Diagnosis (GDD)principle.
In many diagnosis-and-repairdomains, diagnostic reasoning cannot be abstracted from repair
Reasoner
actions, nor from actions necessary to obtain diagnostic information. We call these exploratorycorrective domains. In TraumAID 2.0, a consultation system for multiple trauma management, we have developed and implemented a
framework for reasoning in such domains which
integrates diagnostic reasoning with planning
and action. In this paper, we present GoalFigure l: Basic Cycle of Reasoning, Planning and Action
Directed Diagnosis (GDD), the diagnostic reasoning component of this framework Taking
In addition, we showed that in systems where activity is
the view that a diagnosis is only worthwhile to
necessary
for both diagnostic and therapeutic purposes,
the extent that it can affect subsequent decisions,
it is advantageous to integrate diagnostic reasoning and
GDD focuses on the formation of appropriate
planning capabilities. An architecture called Exploratorygoals for its complementary planner.
Corrective Management (ECM) was proposed, in which
a repeated basic cycle of diagnostic reasoning, planning
and action is used (Figure 1). The ECM architecture was
1 Prologue
shown to satisfy the following desiderata for exploratorycorrective domains:
In many domains, it is common to distinguish reasoning and activity concerned with what problems need be
1. It allows interleaving diagnosis and repair.
addressed from that reasoning concerned with how to ad2. ILpositions the diagnostic reasoner to
dress those problems. As such, Artificial Intelligence (Al)
(a) set diagnostic and therapeutic goals;
subsumes as separate sub-disciplines diagnosis research,
(b)
use incoming evidence to monitor the actions
seeking the source (or sources) of a system's faulty behavand/or other events;
ior, and planning research, concerned with the construe(c) reason about changes in knowledge or state to
tion of action plans to achieve certain goals. Based on that
adapt current goals.
dichotomy, most diagnostic programs take a diagnosis as
their objective.
3. It positions the planner to mediate between concurrent diagnostic and therapeutic needs.
In last year's workshop, in a paper titled "TowardsGoalDiagnosis", we argued this may be inadequate.
TraumAID 2.0 mebber et 923 is a consultation sysIn trauma management, for example, therapy is the ultitem f,, the diagnosis and treatment of multiple trauma
mate objective and diagnosis is the ''price" that one has to
which implements the ECM architecture. A fomalizapay in order to achieve that objective. In such domains,
tion of its goal-direcled diagnostic reasoning is the fodiagnosis should only persist so long as it can affect those
cus of *is paper, whereas its complementary planning
'The author was supported in part by a gaduate fellowparadigm,
Progressive Horizon
Pm)* is
described elsewhere Pym0n et a1 921. Each consultation
ship, ARO Grant DAAU)3-89C0031PRI, and National Library
session in TraumAID 2.0 consists of several cycles of reaof Medicine
1 ~ ~0~ 0 5 1 2 1 7 - 0 1m. e validation paof
soning, pli3IIIIing and acting.
TraumAID 2.0 is supported by an AHCPR grant HS06740-02.

Abstract

The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews related work. Section 3 begins the introduction of GDD with
a formal rule-based language and a simple inference from
observations to conclusions and goals. Diagnostic problems are defined in this language and their solutions correspond to the closure of that inference. Taking a higher
level perspective on the role of GDD reasoning within a
complete ECM session, Section 4 begins with a meta-level
algorithmic description of the ECM algorithm, continues
with a short discussion of issues pertaining to the actual
implementation of diagnostic and therapeutic strategies in
such systems, and concludes with an illustrative example
of a complete session. Section 5 extends the paradigm to
effectively deal with conrradictory information.

2

Related Work

2.1 Formal Diagnosis

Recent years have seen significant advances in formal approaches to diagnosis. A large number of approaches and
frameworks have been suggested: probabilistic classifiers
and discriminators, logical consistency-based and abductive paradigms, graph-based formulations in which causal
and coincidental relations are modeled, etc. Some of the
frameworks combine and/or unify two or more paradigms.
However, all these these formalizations take diagnosis broadly defined as a characterization of the current state
of affairs - as their solution and goal. Our Goal-Directed
Diagnostic paradigm takes a different view of diagnosis
and its objectives.
To understand this view, consider that general theories
of diagnosis give rise to a (sometimes large) number of
hypothetical characterizations that are consistent with, or
that explain the observed failure. In such instances, it is
necessary to choose among such possibilities. An important observation made by [Poole & Provan 901 is that the
optimality of a diagnosis must depend on post-diagnosis
goals. To that end, [Provan & Poole 911 advocate the use
of utilities in order to choose among different potential diagnoses. [Poole & Provan 911 take that approach one step
further, realizing that there is often no need for a complete
explanation and that the granularity of a solution depends
on its uses, and also on available tests.

formalizations, their theory has no explicit notion of a diagnosis. Instead, a sequence of tests and repair actions is
sought, that if applied to the current state, will imply (as
in a logical proof) a restoration of the diagnosed system to
a proper working condition. Presented not as a theory of
diagnosis but as a theory of repairplanning, their work applies a possible-models planning approach [Winslett 881 to
a diagnostic domain. The link between diagnosis and repair planning is also emphasized by pepper & Kahn 871.
[Rushby & Crow 911 formalize reconfiguration, a limited
form of repair, using an extension of Reiter's theory of
diagnosis [Reiter 871.
In domains such as trauma management, planning and
action are necessary for both diagnosis and repair. At the
same time, diagnostic reasoning and activity are necessary
to (a) set goals for, (b) monitor the execution of, and (c)
verify the actual results of actions.
Current work on sequential diagnosis has often taken a
simplistic view of information acquisition. While the potential, or expected, discriminatory power of a given piece
of information for the problem at hand is considered, the
activity necessary to obtain it is not (i.e. either only simple questions are considered, or a simple cost function is
attached to every piece of information). Of course, researchers have realized that this approach is inadequate:

"One limitation of DART in its present form is that it
doesn't take into account the cost of tests .... Unfortunately, the evaluation of test cost can be quite di@ult
because of dependencies on sequencing and grouping."
[Genesereth 841
Planning researchers, as early as STRIPS, have studied
these issues extensively. The ECM architecture thus uses
its planning capabilities not only for repair, but also for
information acquisition. It also uses planning to mediate
between diagnostic and therapeutic activities when multiple problems concurrently require both [Rymon 931. That
strong tie between diagnosis and therapy is common in
medical practice and is evident in many A1 medical management systems1. What we add here is a formalization
of the relationship between the two.
2.2 AMORD

Realistically, diagnosis is rarely an independent process:
more often it serves the purpose of another process, e.g.
repair. The GDD paradigm, presented here, is part of a
total approach for reasoning in exploratory-corrective domains which combines diagnostic reasoning, planning and
action [Rymon 931. In that framework, the main purpose
of diagnostic reasoning is generating proper goals; diagnosis purely for characterization's sake becomes a secondary
concern.

AMORD [deKleer et al 771 is a general purpose problem solver which has accompanying truth maintenance
and planning facilities. The main thesis behind AMORD
is that combinatorially explosive reasoning can often be
avoided if a problem solver reasons explicitly about its
own reasoning. Explicitly encoded reasoning control is
shown effective in avoiding irrelevant, or useless inferences. TraurnAID's GDD reasoner shares this intuition.

Friedrich et al 911 share much of that insight. Considering diagnosis as part of an overall diagnosis-and-repair
process, they correctly observe that repair does not always
require a complete diagnostic explanation. Unlike other

p. 589, referring to MYCIN,
Shortliffe and Rennels write: "Although MYCm is often described as a diagnostic pmgram, its
principal motivation was therapy planning ".

'In an article in the Encyclopedia of Artificial Intelligence,

The key difference between the two paradigms is their
distinct objectives: while AMORD's objective is to avoid
irrelevant or useless inferences, the objective of GDD is
to avoid unimportant, and possibly dangerous, actions.
Although GDD can also be viewed as a general purpose
reasoning scheme, the result of the distinct objectives is
that even though both systems compute beliefs and goals,
AMORD focuses on the former, whereas GDD focuses on
the latter. A more detaiIed technical comparison between
AMORD and the MVL-based inference system used to
implement GDD can be found in Rymon 931.

3 A Formulation of Goal-Directed Diagnosis
Goal-Directed Diagnosis (GDD) begins with the point of
view that diagnosis is only worthwhile if it has the potential to affect future decisions. Thus, while we accept
the common definition of a diagnosis as a case characterization, we believe that different purposes can lead to
dzflerent characterizations of the same situation. For example, different purposes may lead to different refinement
efforts. GDD allows explicit encoding of purposes, which
it uses to guide its problem solving. More specifically,
throughout a problem solving session, the GDD reasoner
will maintain both a belief - a description of the current
characterization, and an attitude - encoding a sense of
purpose by pointing to goals worth pursuing.
In a recurrent cycle, the GDD reasoner takes as input
a diagnostic problem, characterized by (1) observations;
and (2) mappings (rules) from from observations to conclusions (belief), and from observations and conclusions
to goals (attitude). A solution to such problem is a new
attitude-belief assignment. Goals, propositions regarded
as relevant by the current attitude, are the addressed by
the accompanying planner and Served by the actor. New
observations result in a modified diagnostic problem, and
a new cycle is initiated.
In this section, we describe a rule-based language for specifying diagnostic problems in GDD a corresponding inference scheme.
3.1 Underlying Framework: Multi-Valued Logics

paradigm to more expressive domains in a consistent fashion. Importantly, it allows explicit representation of contradictions (cf. section 5).

In this new fonnalization of GDD, each proposition is assigned a value drawn from the cross product of two bilattices: one representing belief, the other attitude. The notion of belief is interpreted regularly, whereas the attitude
component represents problem-solving control information and measures the relevance of acquiring information
about, or achieving the condition described by, the particular proposition. Importantly, each of these bilattices still
maintains both truth and knowledge sub-component..
Within Ginsberg.s paradigm, domain knowledge is expressed by
&st-order formulae, and thus requires
an underlying theorem prover. In contrast, TraurnAID
uses a rule-based representation which is simpler to handle, but incomplete in general. Instead of reconstructing TraumAID's knowledge, we chose to specialize Ginsberg's theory to the rule-based case. While the material
presented next is self-contained, the reader is referred to
[Ginsberg 881 for a more complete coverage of MVL.

3.2 Attitude and Belief

During the diagnostic process, the GDD reasoner will
maintain and update an attitude and a belief for propositional statements. To remain general, propositions may
be any fact about the patient or the world that the reasoner
may know to hold, may know not to hold, may assume,
may want to know whether hold, may want to achieve.
may be confused about, etc. The reasoner's attitude towards and/or belief in a given proposition will change over
time as a result of new information becoming available,
new inferences drawn, activity carried out, etc.
Definition 3.1 A Lattice

A lattice is a triple (L,A,V), where L is its domain, A
("meet") and V ("join") are binary operations from L onto
itself that are (1) idempotent, i.e. a A a=a, a V a=a; (2)
commutative, i.e. a A b=b A a, a V b=b V a; (3) associative,
i.e. (a A b)Ac=aA(b A c), (a V b)Vc=aV(b V c), and (4) obey
the absorption laws, i.e. aA(a V b)=a, aV(a A b)=a.

Multi-Valued Logics (MVL) [Ginsberg 881 is a formal
framework for inference in which each proposition is assigned not only a truth value, corresponding to the strength
of belief in that proposition being true orfalse, but also a
knowledge assessment, measuring roughly the amount of
knowledge used to derive such belief. Bilattices, in which
one partial order corresponds to the truthfulness measure
and the other to the knowledge one, are used by MVL as
domains for truth-value assignment.

Alternatively, a lattice can be defined as a partially ordered set, any two elements of which have a greatest
lower bound (glb) and a least upper bound (lub). The
two definitions coincide by taking lub(a, b)=a V b, and
glb(a, b)=a A b. A lattice is said to be complete if lub and
glb can be defined for any subset of the lattice's elements.
Thus, any lattice with a finite domain is complete.

Our goaldirected diagnostic paradigm (GDD) was first
formalized using a three-valued logic: true, false and unknown [Rymon et a1 911. This paper presents an MVLbased reformulation of GDD. The immediate result of
this reformulation is the ability to extend the inference

A bilattice is a sextuple (B,A,V,.,+,-) such that:

Definition 3 2 A Bilattice

1. L1 dgf(B,A,V) and L2 dgf(B,.,+) are both complete
lattices; and
2. 1:B

+

B is a mapping such that:

(a)
(b)

= 1; and
is a homomorphism from L1 to its dual
L1 gf(B,V,A) and from L2 to itself.
l
2

'

3 3 Goals

7

Figure 2: Basic Truth-Knowledge Bilattice
Ginsberg discusses bilattices that are based on two partial
orders: truth-wise ( S t )and knowledge-wise (Sk). That
is, each proposition is described by how strongly we believe it is true, and by how much knowledge was involved
in inferring that belief. The smallest nontrivial bilattice
(Figure 2) has four points: T (absolute truth), F (false),
U (unknown), and I(contradictory). In that bilattice, the
<, partial order defines one lattice (B,A,V), whereas the
<k defines another lattice (B,-,+). In any truth-knowledge
bilattice, negation reverses the truth capacity of a proposition, leaving its knowledge capacity unchanged. In particular, within the basic bilattice, 7 maps T to F and vice
versa, leaving U and Iuntouched.
Two, possibly distinct, bilattices are used in GDD as domains for attitude and belief respectively:
Definition 3 3 Attitude and Belief
Given a set of primitive propositions H gf
9 an attitude maps H to an attitude bilattice BA
a belief maps H to a belief bilattice BB
an attitude-belief combines the two and maps H to
the cross product BA x BB. Conversely, it can aIso
be viewed as a pair ( $ A , $ B ) of attitude and belief.
For our purposes here, we shall take both B A and BB
to be represented by the 4-point bilattice. The belief
bilattice, following Ginsberg's suggestion, is defined by
the truth-knowledge partial orders. In the attitude bilattice, a proposition is described by its relevance (5,) and
the knowledge used to derive that relevance ( s k ) . Notably, one's knowledge with respect to the truthfulness of
a proposition need not equal, in general, one's knowledge
with respect to the relevance of that same proposition.
Technically, the extreme points in the belief bilattice are
called T, and F, whereas same points are called R (for
relevant) and I (for irrelevant) in the attitude bilattice.
Extensions to more complex bilattices are discussed in
[Ginsberg 88, Rymon 931
We shall say that an attitude-belief is strongly grounded
if belief is restricted to {T, F). We shall say that it is
weakly grounded if such restriction holds for all relevant
propositions.

Goals are a semalltic interpretation of an attitude-belief
assignment to propositions. Generally speaking, a proposition p is a goaI if its attitude assignment is high on the
relevance partial order (5,). Of course, not every such
proposition need be attempted; it may already be believed
to hold (belief=T). In general, one has to define which
combinations of relevance and achievement levels need
be addressed, in what order, etc. Such considerations,
however, are beyond the scope of, and do not affect the
operation of our GDD reasoner. Within the ECM architecture, such determination is left to the planner.
A goal's nature, in particular its characterization as diagnostic or therapeutic, plays an important role in deciding
whether or not to address it. Taking a somewhat simplified view, a diagnostic goal, aimed at determination, may
be regarded satisfied whenever the proposition is proved
either true or false. A therapeutic goal, on the other hand,
will only be satisfied with the actual achievement of the
condition it describes (i.e. belief=T).
Rules used by GDD to express knowledge have their antecedents expressed solely in belief terms. However, in
encoding diagnostic and therapeutic strategies in GDD,
we found it useful to also use the relevance (or irrelevance) of a goal. Thus, a mapping from the attitude- to
the belief-bilattice was added:
atfifude(a)gf

{

T a=R
F a=I
a otherwise

That mapping models, roughly, the belief in relevance of
the given proposition.
3.4 A Language for Representing Diagnostic Knowledge

We use Prolog-like rules to represent knowledge. Two
types of rules are be used: one for infemng belief, the
other for inferring goals.
Definition 3.4 An Antecedent
An antecedent is recursively defined as either:
1. a primitive proposition h; or
2. attitude(h), where h is a proposition; or
3. -a, where a is an antecedent; or
4. true(a), false(a), unknown(a), or contradictory(a),
where a is an antecedent; or
5. known(a), unless(a), or compatible-with(a), where a

is an antecedent.
Definition 3 5 Rules
A rule R has two parts: a body, or a premise, which is a
set of antecedents; and a header, or consequent, which is
a single proposition. GDD has two types of rules:

I. Evidential rules afJect belief: They map evidence and
lower-level conclusions to conclusions:

Ant1 A Anta A .. .A Ant,

d

For example, the following evidential rule concludes
whether a patient's shock is due to abdominal bleeding:
Shock A

3. Setting a Therapeutic goal:
(. . . ) D Relievepressurepericardia2sac
"It is necessary to address the problem".
4. Satisfying a Therapeutic Goal:
(. . .) 3 Relievepressurepericardialsac

'The problem has been successfully addressed".
3.5 A Diagnostic Problem Instance

-Single-wound-toupper_chestA
Definition 3.6 A Diagnostic Problem Instance
unless(Pericardia1-Tamponade)A
unless(MassiveHemothorax) A
An instance of a diagnostic problem is a quadruple
unless(TensionPneumothorax)
=+ Shock~ofpossibleabdomina1~rigin P dgf(H,RB,Mo,OBS)such that:
H={hl,h 2 , .. . ,h , ) is a set of propositions;
2. Goal Setting rules afJect attitude. lkey map evidence
a RB is a set of evidential and goal-setting rules;
and conclusions to goals, or more precisely to anitude:

Antl AAnt2 A . .. A Ant, ~g
For example, the following goal-setting rule concludes whether it is relevant to know whether a patient has hematuria.
Gunshot-wound~oabdomenA
Bulletinabdomen D Hematuria

A fact may often be provable in several alternative ways.
Similarly, a goal may need to be set in a variety of contexts. We therefore allow a conclusion to be made via
a number of evidential rules, and a goal to be set via a
number of goal-setting rules.
Conversely, we allow the same proposition to serve as the
header of both goal-setting and evidential rules. In particular, as header to a goal-setting rule, a diagnostic or
therapeutic goal means that the rule is used to conclude
that the goal is worth adopting. An evidential rule whose
header is that same goal is used to conclude whether or
not it has been satisfied. Similarly, a goal-setting rule
whose header is a clinical condition is used to conclude
that it is relevant to investigate that condition. A similarly
headed evidential rule is used to conclude whether or not
the condition holds. Consider, for example, the diagnosis
and repair of a pericardial tamponade2. During that process, corresponding diagnostic and therapeutic goals are
instantiated, addressed, and satisfied:
1. Setting a Diagnostic (knowledge) goal:
( . . ) D Pericardial-Tamponade
"It is necessary to h o w if the problem exists".
2. Satisfying a Diagnostic (knowledge) goal:
(. . .) 3 Pericardial-Tamponade

.

"Conclude that the problem exists".
pericardial tarnponade is a condition where blood fills
the pericardial sac, pressuring the heart and interfering with its
operation.

Mo C H is a set of observed manifestations (i.e.
propositions for which we can, initially, assert that
they are either true or false, with some degree of
confidence);
OBS : M o + BB, is a belief (restricted to Mo).
3.6 Inference

In the basic form of inference, to be introduced next, a
closure of the observations given the evidential and goalsetting rules is computed. The basic inference is simpler
and more intuitive than that in [Ginsberg 881. In Section
5, we will have to extend it to a form that is closer to
Ginsberg's in order to support reasoning about contradictory information. In order to define the basic inferential
closure, let us first define the semantic interpretation of
rules.
Definition 3.7 Belief Assignment for M Antecedent

Let
& ) be the current attitude-belief (defined on
primitive propositions). For any antecedent (Ant), the
belief in that antecedent, PB(Ant),is defined as follows:
1. If Ant is a proposition h, q5; (Ant)
2. If Ant has the form attitude(h),

q'~~(h);

4; (Ant) dsfattitude(^$* ( h ) ) ;
3. If Ant has the form -.Ant', where Ant' is an antecedent, & (Ant) dAf -4; (Ant');
4. If Ant has the form f (Ant'), where Ant' is an antecedent, then
If f is one of four belief predicates (true,false,
unknown, contradictory), then
4; (Ant') = T
4; (lruc(Antl))dgf T
F otherwise
Similarly for known, *unless, and compatible-

(

with;

2~

a

&(known(Antl))

F q5;(Antt) = U
I &(Ant') = l
T

otherwise

r

r

4; (unless(Antl)) sf
-4; (Ant') V 74; (known(Antl))
$;(compatible - with(Antl)) dg
4; (Ant') V -$;3 (known(Antl))

Belief predicates will be useful where reasoning in absolute terms is necessary, since they map terms to {TP).
Thus, h and true(h), are interpreted differently. The same
is true of -h and false(h). Similarly, ~known(h)refers to
any situation in which a concrete belief cannot be reached
whereas unknown(h) describes the particular such situation (U) resulting from lack of information. In the basic
bilattice, another member of the former class is Iwhich
corresponds to contradictory information.
Definition 3.8 Belief Assignment for a Rule's Body

Let ($A, $B) be an attitude-belief, R a rule with antecedents {Ant;),k,, , then define
$k(body(R)) dgfA=:
(Ant;)
Definition 3.9 Consistent Inference (closure)

An attitude-belief ($A, $B) is a consistent inference for a
problem instance P iff

Similarly, if R is a god-setting rule, let {&):=,
be the set of goal-setting rules for d, and let v
vf,, 6 (body(&)). If attitude(dA(d)) # v
then set $ ~ ( d )= attitude-'(v) and mark aI1
rules in which d appears in the antecedents as
needing to be fired.
Unmark R.

sf

3.7 Solving a Diagnostic Problem

The formal definition of a solution in the GDD framework
emphasizes its distinction from other diagnostic frarneworks.
Definition 3.1 1 A Diagnostic Explanation (Diagnosis)

Let ($A , $B) be the inferential closure for a problem instance P, then $B is the diagnostic explanation (diagnosis) for P. It is weakly complete if ( $ A , 4 ~ is) weakly
grounded (i.e. no relevant propositions are unknown), and
strongly complete if ($A, $B) is strongly grounded (i.e. all
propositions are known).

1. It coincides with OBS, i.e V h€Mo. $~(h)=0BS(h);

2. For any proposition d€H-Mo, let { R , } : = , be all the
evidential rules with d in their header, then
$B(d) = vf=l$&(body(R,));

Most formal diagnostic frameworks are content with a
diagnosis as a solution. In GDD, we emphasize the importance of the goals, and consequently of the actions,
adopted while arriving at a diagnosis.

3. Similarly, for any proposition d€H, let
be
A complete diagnostic session consists of several cycles
all the goal-setting rules with d in their header, then
through the ECM architecture. In a given diagnosis-and$A (d) = attit~de-~(~f=~$;3(body(R,)));
repair scenario, if the GDD principle is adopted, it is unlikely that a strongly complete diagnosis be sought. In the
Solving a diagnostic problem requires computing a consiscase
of a weakly complete diagnosis, while all diagnostic
tent inference. While in general, there is no guarantee that
goals
have been fulfilled, some of the therapeutic goals
such an inference is unique, computable, or even exists,
may
still
need attention (recall that a therapeutic goal is
the following algorithm is a straightforward, greedy atsatisfied only when it is assigned a T value. The important
tempt at computing it. It begins with the observations, aspoint, however, is that the degree to which a diagnosis is
suming all other propositions to be unknown (U). Then, in
refined is to a great extent a function of potential actions,
a forward-chaining fashion, it repeatedly enforces Definiand of their expected outcomes. In the ECM architecture,
tion 3.9 until a fixed point (inferential closure) is reached.
the termination criterion is thus part of the planner. Therefore the importance of the attitude part of the inferential
Algorithm 3.10 Computing an Inferential Closure
closure: it defines the goals which will be pursued next.
1. Start off with the observations, by setting
Goals are the "architectural duty" of the GDD reasoner.
$A(h)
U, for all ~ E H
Definition 3.12 A Solution to a Diagnostic Problem
OBS(h) h E Mo
otherwise
A solution to a diagnostic problem is the inferential closure, i.e. the pair ($A, $B).
2. Mark all the rules (indicating they need to be fired).
y

3. Until none of the rules is marked, let R be such rule
4 The Diagnostic-Therapeutic Process
and let d be its header.
r If R is an evidential rule, let { R , } ~ = ,be the
Having defined a solution to a single diagnostic problem,
set of all evidential rules for d, and let v dgf it is important to understand the overall process, i.e. a
body(&)). If $ ~ ( d )# v then set complete diagnostic-therapeutic session, as captured by
repeated cycles of the ECM architecture. We begin with
~ $ ~ ( d=) v and mark all rules in which d appears in the antecedents as needing to be fired.
a meta-level algorithmic description of that process. We

then discuss shortly issues pertaining to the irnplementation of diagnostic and therapeutic strategies within that
architecture, using the GDD paradigm. An illustrative example of a complete diagnostic-therapeutic session concludes this section.
4.1

Integrating Diagnosis, Planning, and Action:
The ECM Algorithm

Algorithm 4.1 calls the diagnostic reasoner whenever new
information appears. The solution it provides is used to
guide the complementary planner in the choice of activity
which, in turn, may provide new information to start a
new cycle.
Algorithm 4.1 ECM Diagnosis-and-Repair Algorithm

1. Initialize

( d A ,$ B ) to coincide with OBS;

2. Compute an inferential closure for

($A, $B);

3. Construct a plan P for the combination of goals indicated by ( $ A , $B ) ;
4. Unless P is empty do
a Execute P until the first new piece of information @,v) comes in;
a Update
rjB) to reflect (h,v);
a Go to step 2;

Note that the criterion to terminate diagnosis is not necessarily related to the concreteness (groundness) of the
current characterization (the diagnostic explanation, or diagnosis). Diagnosis terminates when the planner returns
an empty plan, e.g. when all goals have been addressed
or when no means are available for addressing remaining
goals. Also note that any newly provided information,
whether it has been called for or not, whether it is acquired via diagnostic or via therapeutic activity, will be
used by the algorithm to refine its current diagnosis and
possibly trigger new goals.

extremely demanding computationally, much of the planning effort can be saved if unnecessary, non-contributing,
goals are inhibited before being passed on to the planner.
The basic approach to goal inhibition is to qualify goalsetting rules by the negation of any inhibition condition.
Consider, for example a patient with a right lumbar injury.
Normally, such injury would suggest a possible duodenal
injury:
A standard test for duodenal injury is a CT scan. However,
this lengthy and costly procedure should not be pursued
independently if there is already a perceived need for a
laparotomy. The surgical procedure will expose any duodenal injury, if present. Thus, one could qualify the above
rule as follows:
Righflumbar-wound A
unless(L.uparotomy-required)
D ~uodenalinjury
While correct, the problem with such inhibition scheme is
that if the inhibition condition is complex, rules become
even more complex and hard to maintain. In addition,
overloading rules makes them less interpretable: the separate function of each of a rule's antecedents becomes unclear (cf. [Clancey 831). Instead, inhibiting relationships
between goals and between goals and conclusions can be
specified separately. For each goal g, we can define an
inhibition clause which will then be compiled (as a macro
expansion) into all of that goal's goal-setting rules.
Definition 4.2 Goal Inhibition Clause

Given a goal g, inhibit(g)is a clause(or clauses) specifying the conditions under which g should not be pursued.
Technically, the macro expansion procedure for a goal inhibition clause creates a new internal proposition called
inhibit(g) and a set of rules headed by that proposition
that correspond to the condition itself. In the above example, the following new rule is added:

4 3 Goal Inhibition: using GDD to encode Strategies

To demonstrate its usefulness, we have used GDD to implement a number of diagnostic and therapeutic strategies drawn from the literature and from our experience in
TraumAID. Two mechanisms that were useful in that task
have already been presented: goal-setting rules, as a mean
to drive goals, and planning, as a mean to resolve conflicts
between competing goals. Goal inhibition, a third mechanism which we have found usefkl in implementing such
strategies, is presented next. For lack of space, we will
not present the strategies themselves; the interested reader
is referred to [Rymon 931.
Trauma management presents an on-going interplay between diagnosis and therapy in which goals often have to
be delayed or even ignored. Goal interaction is generally
addressed by TraumAID's planner, but since planning is

Then, we pad the body of every goal-setting rule for g as
follows: body'(R)
body(R) A -.true(inhibit(g))

sf

An alternative approach to goal inhibition is based on an
extension of GDD to allow negative conclusions (goals)
in rule headers (cf. Section 5). Note that so far, rule
headers have simply been proposition names and have
been interpreted positively, i.e. a rule has been viewed
as an argument for its header-proposition. The formal interpretation of rules headed by a negated proposition is
somewhat complex, and requires work. Informally, we
can think of a rule headed by -.p as an argument against
p. Such extension to our representation allows a more
natural (and convenient) form of goal-inhibition: it can
simply be viewed as a "reason" not to pursue that goal.
Taking that view, it is natural to consider that particular

be updated to T. (If X-ray reports are assumed to be complete, beliefs about all other features of the X-ray will be
updated to F.) While each of these updated beliefs may
trigger further investigation, for this example we will ignore all but the hemothorax finding. That finding triggers
the evidential rule:

reason together with all other reasons for and against that
goal's pursuit. Goal-inhibitionrules are used for that purpose. Let g be the said goal, we add a rule of the form:
inhibit(g) D ~ g .
Under the framework discussed in Section 5, a contradictory attitude ( I ) will be assigned to a goal for which both
a goal-setting and a goal-inhibition rule have succeeded.
In our previous example, we will write:
Another way in which goals can be effectively inhibited,
and which is sometimes preferable in implementing diagnostic strategies is to "force" a concrete value (i.e. T
or F) on the goal's underlying proposition. Such an approach will often be preferable when the real value of the
inhibited goal can be inferred at the presence of the inhibiting condition; scaled diagnosis, discussed next, is a
case in point. Unfortunately, that is not always possible:
for example, nothing can be concluded about whether or
not a patient has a duodenal injury in the above example.
The net effect of that approach is that the goal remains
relevant, but is regarded achieved by the planner and thus
not addressed.
4 3 Example

To illustrate the effect of multiple diagnostic and therapeutic cycles in TraurnAID 2.0's ECM architecture, we will
follow a case from the initial observations and the suspected diagnosis, to its validation, its treatment and the
verification of its success.
Consider a patient presenting in the emergency room in
stable condition, suffering a gun-shot wound to the left
chest. A new diagnostic problem is instantiated with these
observations. Let (dA,q5B) denote the system's current
attitude-belief. Initially dA(h)=q5B(3)=U, for all propositions hEH. As soon as the observations are reported, d B
is set accordingly.
In the next stage, the closure of (dA,dB) is computed.
In particular, we use the following goal-setting rule to
set the diagnostic goal SimpleHemothorax(Lefr),aimed at
knowing whether or not the patient suffers a hemothorax3.
At this point, if no other issues arise, control is transferred to the planner. A planner such as TraumAID's
current planner would recommend a Survey Chest X-Ray
as a means of obtaining the desired information.
Suppose the physician orders an X-ray, and from the Xray reports signs of hemothorax and a compound fracture
to the left ribs. While the latter information had not been
solicited, the system's belief toward both propositions will
3~ hemothorax is internal bleeding in the chest cavity, between the lungs and the chest wall, that results in the collapse
of a lung.

The system thus changes its belief in the presence of
hemothorax from U to T. That change may be interpreted
as a satisfaction of the diagnostic goal set by (1). Note too
that we must distinguish a hemothorax finding from the
condition of having a hemothorax, since the condition can
be diagnosed in other ways, such as through the presence
of decreased breath sounds, as in the following rule:

The presence of a hemothorax triggers the following goalsetting rule:

The attitude toward this therapeulic goal is thus updated
from U to R, and the goal is referred to the planner. A
planner such as TraumAID's would recommend addressing it through the insertion of a chest tube, Evidence that
a chest tube has been inserted leads to a goal becoming
relevant of ensuring its proper placement, and of checking
that it is functioning correctly. In addition to these two
cycles of reasoning and activity (a subsequent X-ray is
required to check proper placement), the following rule is
evaluated to check that the treatment goal for the simple
hemothorax is actually satisfied:

In summary, we have tracked the hemothorax from the
initial wound report, through its suspicion as more investigation is recommended, continuing with the acquisition
of more evidence that allows for concluding its presence
and the need to address it, and finally, making sure that
the treatment actually works.

5

Reasoning with Contradictory Information

5.1 Explicit Representation of Negation

Even though I is part of both our belief and attitude bilattices, it will never appear in practice given the basic
inference paradigm. One may argue this to be a good
feature of our inference system, since Iwill often lead
to a host of problems (see [Ginsberg 881). On the other

hand, I=T+F, and can thus be used to represent the copresence of contradictory evidence. Explicit representation of contradictions provides a system with important
flexibility. Consider, for example, the diagnosis of a Tension Pneumothord (TP). Two alternative methods can
be used for that purpose:

The added rules model explicitly the consequences of negative test results. In addition, we redefine the inference
to a form which is closer to Ginsberg's and which allows
combining negative and positive contributions:
Definition 5.1 Consistent Inference (redefined)

An attitude-belief ( d A ,4
problem instance P iff
2. Needleaspirafion1:he~t(Positive)

+ TensionPneumothorax

Medically, positive indication in one of the tests is enough
for the diagnosis to be justifiably made. However, a physician will also assume lack of tension pneumothorax if any
of the two tests has come up negative. It is medically unjustified to take the other test as well. Unfortunately, by
our semantic interpretation of the above rules, TP will be
tagged unknown (F V U) in such case. It was not proved,
but cannot be dismissed since not all the rules have failed.
To account for that description, we may choose to augment the above rules as follows:

I '. X-rayshows-EnsionPneumothorarA
compatible-with(Needleaspirationrhest(Positive))
+ TensionPneumothorax
2 '. Needleaspiration~hest(Positive)A

compatible-wi:h(X-rayshows-TensionPneu~notlrorax)
+ TensionPneumothorax
The added antecedents will cause the failure of both rules
if any of the tests comes up negative. Otherwise, if any or
both tests come up positive, and there is no contradictory
evidence, TP is positively concluded.
We now consider the case in which tests provide contradictory evidence. As so far presented, both rules will
fail and a negative TP will be assessed. While for some
propositions that may be a plausible solution, it is not the
medical interpretation in the case of a TP. In that case,
medical practice will default to positive treatment.
So far, in our semantics, a proposition was true or false if
it was so asserted or concluded. It was unknown if it was
not reported or could not be concluded. In other words,
unknown arose from lack of knowledge. Contradictions
belong to a different class of unknowns. To reason about
contradictions, we first extend the original rule representation to allow a header to be a negated proposition. Then,
we can simply add two more rules to the original ones:

'A tension pneumothorax is a condition in which air leaks
into the chest cavity between the chest wall and the lung to the
point beyond which the return of blood to the heart is at risk.

~is )a consistent inference for a

1. It coincides with OBS, i.e V h€ Mo q6B@)=OBS(h);_
2. For any proposition d€H-Mo, let {&};k,Lbe all the
evidential rules with d in their header, {R, If=, all
the evidential rules with ~d in their header, then

3. Similarly, for any proposition d€H, let {&):=rbe all
the goal-setting rules with d i n their header, {R,}:=,
all the goal-setting rules with din their header, then
'$A (d)

= attitude-'(Ci';=, (4; (body(&)) V U)+

+ ~ f = ~ ( - 9 ; ( b o d Y ( Z ) )A U));

Using the new inference procedure, given the above rules,
TP will be assigned a I belief, to indicate the contradictory information with respect to its presence.
5.2 Dealing with Contradictions

Apart from their actual representation, two major concerns
need be addressed when one represents and reasons about
contradictory information. The first problem is a technical
one: under the above inference scheme, I propagates
itself. We call that problem pollution, and a few hints
as to how to deal with it can be found in [Rymon 931.
The second problem is the semantic interpretation of I,
i.e. what to do with a proposition for which a Ibelief
(attitude) is assigned?
Unfortunately, the answer here varies. In some cases, a
positive default is appropriate whereas in other circumstances a negative one is more plausible. In some circumstances, none of the conclusions can be safely made and
further investigation is warranted. In other cases a default
to a particular treatment (e.g. the TP case) is appropriate
whereas in yet other circumstances, a conclusive decision
is irrelevant to solving the problem.
The GDD principle provides us with a major escape by
stating that irrelevant contradictions need not be bothered
with. That, of course does not free us completely and in
general the desired behavior should be encoded. In the
TP case, we have:

6 Summary and Early Evaluation
We assume that diagnosis is only worthwhile to the extent
that it can affect decisions, and so have presented a formalization of a goal-directed diagnostic paradigm (GDD).
In contrast to other diagnostic paradigm, GDD defines a
solution to a diagnostic problem not only in explanation
terms, but also and more importantly in terms of the recommendations it implies.
GDD works within the exploratory-corrective management (ECM) architecture in which control cycles between
a diagnostic reasoner, planner, and an actor. In this architecture, diagnosis is used to initiate both diagnostic and
therapeutic goals, to adapt those goals to reflect new information, and to verify their actual achievement. Planning
is used to address and mediate between concurrent diagnostic and therapeutic needs.
The new MVL-based formalization of GDD extends the
original paradigm and allows reasoning with contradictory information and with defaults. A number of diagnostic and therapeutic strategies were shown to be naturally
implementable in this framework CRymon 931.
TraurnAID Webber et al 921 is a consultation system for
multiple trauma management which has been developed
over the past eight years as a collaboration between the
Department of Computer and Information Science in the
University of Pennsylvania and the Department of Surgery
in the Medical College of Pennsylvania. Its new version,
TraumAID 2.0, implements an ECM architecture in which
diagnostic reasoning is complemented with a planning capability. TraumAID 2.0 has been successfully validated
on 266 theoretical cases. Under a grant from AHCPR and
with the help of a panel of national trauma management
experts, we began evaluating its recommendations with
respect to actual care provided by physicians in MCP, as
well as to that of an earlier version.
The MVL-based formalization of GDD is new and extends
the diagnostic reasoning in TraumAID 2.0. It has been
implemented in prototype form and has been functionally
tested on parts of TraumAID's knowledge-base.
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